Grok Assisted DELOL Shield Black-Box Cryptanalytic Test Report

Four DELOL Shield-protected files (car.dat, cart.dat, metro.dat, rat.dat) together with a matching 256-byte public Lineage Map (key.dat) were subjected to independent ciphertext analysis and classical/semi-classical cryptanalytic testing.

The test environment was deliberately stronger than a typical real-world ciphertext-only attack: four independently protected samples generated from the same source and the same DELOL key were available simultaneously, along with the corresponding 256-byte public permutation.

Despite these favorable conditions, no coherent plaintext was recovered. The analysis confirmed that the 256-byte key is a complete permutation of the byte alphabet (a DELOL Lineage Map) and that direct substitution, inverse substitution, XOR, Vigenère, RC4-style, and multiple Ghost-Signature-aware variants all failed to produce readable English or any other structured plaintext.

The experiment therefore supplies empirical evidence of resistance to the specific recovery techniques attempted. It does not constitute a formal proof of cryptographic security or of post-quantum security.

You can download those Test Payloads.

The objectives of this independent analysis were:

1. Determine whether the protected files leak recoverable plaintext through statistical or structural analysis.
2. Determine whether multiple same-source / same-key ciphertexts create exploitable relationships.
3. Test whether the supplied 256-byte public Lineage Map functions as a direct decryption table.
4. Investigate whether the construction resembles any conventional algorithm (AES, XOR, Vigenère, RC4, simple substitution, etc.).
5. Assess implications for a hypothetical Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) adversary limited to ciphertext.

The Test Payloads

Each protected file is exactly 1,684 bytes. The samples examined were:

• car.dat: 1,684 bytes
• cart.dat: 1,684 bytes
• metro.dat: 1,684 bytes
• rat.dat: 1,684 bytes

The first four bytes of each ciphertext differ, consistent with DELOL’s documented per-file Ghost Signature (4-byte salt) mechanism. The remaining payload constitutes the protected data.

The four files were intentionally supplied as multiple samples. A real-world attacker would ordinarily possess only a single protected file and no key material.

Public-Key Test Material

key.dat was supplied as the corresponding DELOL public key / Lineage Map.

Measured properties:

• Size: 256 bytes
• Distinct byte values: 256 (complete coverage of 0x00–0xFF)
• Nature: Full permutation of the byte alphabet
• Shannon entropy: 8.000 bits/byte

The key is therefore mathematically a 256-entry bijective mapping, matching the documented DELOL concept of a Lineage Map rather than a conventional repeating-key or AES key.

The entropy values (~6.9 bits/byte) are high but fall short of the near-8.0 bits/byte expected from a well-designed modern stream or block cipher operating in a mode that produces indistinguishable-from-random output. Residual structure is therefore present.

Approximately 67–68 % of each file consists of printable ASCII. When non-printable bytes are removed, the remaining letter distributions closely match English (top letters e, a, t, o, i, n, r, s, l). Chi-squared distances to English are in the low hundreds, versus thousands for pure random printable data.

This English-like structure is statistically genuine and is not an artifact of visual inspection. It indicates that the underlying plaintext is English text and that the protection mechanism did not fully destroy letter-frequency information.

Pairwise byte-identity rates between the four files are only ~2–3 %. The files are therefore independently transformed. Frequency distributions across the four payloads nevertheless remain highly correlated, consistent with a common protection mechanism applied separately to each sample.

Fixed-byte XOR, repeating-key XOR using the 256-byte map, and pairwise XOR of the four samples were tested. None produced coherent plaintext. Applying the key as a repeating XOR stream reduced printable content.

The 256-byte permutation was applied both as cipher_byte → key[cipher_byte] and via its inverse. Both directions reduced printable characteristics and yielded no readable English.

Index-of-Coincidence analysis showed values near random (~0.035–0.037) for all short and medium periods. No convincing repeating-key length emerged. Byte-wise and letter-only Vigenère using the key also failed.

The permutation was treated as an RC4 state table / key schedule. The resulting keystream produced no readable output.

Multiple interpretations of the documented 4-byte Ghost Signature were tested: header salt, footer salt, XOR of the key with the salt, rotation of the S-box by salt-derived offsets, and post-substitution XOR with a cycling salt. All variants failed to recover plaintext.

Letter frequencies of the printable portions were mapped to standard English order. Isolated English-like fragments appeared, but no coherent reconstruction of continuous plaintext was obtained.

Various block and positional rearrangements guided by the key were examined. No defensible plaintext reconstruction resulted.

key.dat is a complete permutation of the byte alphabet. Possession of this map does not, by itself, supply a straightforward inverse transformation of the protected payload. Direct substitution actually degraded the English-like appearance of the data.

Consequently, the DELOL reconstruction process cannot be accurately modeled as a conventional static S-box. The documented interaction between the 4-byte Ghost Signature and the Lineage Map is essential to correct recovery and remains unpublished in the public product literature.

• Four same-source / same-key protected samples were available simultaneously.

• The ciphertext streams are independently transformed (low byte-identity rates).

• Standard XOR, substitution, Vigenère, RC4-style, and transposition attacks did not recover plaintext.

• The supplied 256-byte public permutation does not function as a direct decryption table.

• Ghost-Signature-aware variants based on the public documentation likewise failed.

• No coherent plaintext was obtained under any of the techniques applied.

• Absolute cryptographic security.

• Resistance to every possible classical technique.

• Resistance to an attacker who possesses the private Lineage Map or the official decoder.

• Formal post-quantum security.

• Security against implementation or side-channel attacks.

The experimental setting was stronger than the normal attacker model.

Experimental analyst possessed: four same-source/same-key ciphertexts + the matching 256-byte public Lineage Map + full byte-level access + extensive cross-sample comparison.

Real-world ciphertext-only attacker typically possesses: one protected file, no key material, no additional same-source samples, and no DELOL recovery package.

Even under the stronger experimental conditions, plaintext recovery failed.

An HNDL adversary who archives a single DELOL-protected file today would begin any future recovery attempt with strictly less information than was available in this experiment. The present results supply no evidence that the ciphertext alone yields an obvious recovery path via the classical and semi-classical techniques tested.

Quantum computers do not automatically decrypt arbitrary constructions. Shor’s algorithm targets specific number-theoretic problems; Grover’s algorithm supplies only a quadratic speed-up for generic search. 

For a more rigorous security evaluation the following tests are recommended:

1. Known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks
2. Large-scale same-key ciphertext collection and differential analysis
3. Attempted recovery of the Lineage Map from ciphertext alone
4. Differential analysis focused on Ghost Signatures
5. Avalanche and statistical-independence testing across repeated shielding operations
6. Work-factor estimation for classical and quantum search against the actual construction
7. Implementation-level and side-channel analysis
8. Independent third-party cryptanalysis with access to the decoder specification or binary

This independent analysis deliberately operated under conditions more favorable to an attacker than a typical real-world ciphertext-only scenario. Four protected samples generated from the same source and the same DELOL key were examined, followed by analysis that included the corresponding public Lineage Map and multiple Ghost-Signature-aware recovery attempts.

Plaintext was not recovered.

The result supplies empirical evidence that DELOL Shield does not expose an obvious plaintext recovery path through the classical and semi-classical techniques an AI or human analyst would normally apply first. It does not, by itself, establish a formal security level or post-quantum guarantee.